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SPECIALIZED LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
INSTITUTIONS IN NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES
ANDREW P. MORRISS*
Legal specialization takes several forms: decision-makers and advo-
cates can specialize in particular types of cases, specialized rules can govern
particular types of disputes, facts may be found by experts, appeals heard by
special courts, or some or all of these combined. The American and New
Zealand employment and labor law regimes' make different use of special-
ized decision-makers, in part because of differences in their use of special-
ized legal rules for labor and employment law. These differences provide an
opportunity to assess the appropriateness of specialization in legal decision-
making!
Specialization in the legal system is simply one form of the more gen-
eral phenomenon of specialization of goods and services. When we examine
products provided in the marketplace, we see a wide range in degree of spe-
cialization. Medical services, for example, are provided through networks of
generalists and specialists-we visit an internist for a routine physical, but a
surgeon for an appendectomy. On a more basic level, in a visit to the gro-
cery store in the United States or New Zealand, I can find many varieties of
* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Economics, Case Western Re-
serve University. A.B. (Public Affairs), Princeton, 1981; J.D., M.Pub.Aff., The University of
Texas at Austin, 1984; Ph.D. (Economics), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994.
1. Throughout the Article, "employment law" refers to the general rules governing the
labor market and "labor law" refers to rules governing only the union sector.
2. I put aside the question of whether labor and/or employment law are "different"
enough to justify specialization. A case can be made for special rules for labor and/or em-
ployment law that employees lack sufficient bargaining power to secure their "fair" share of
the gains from trade or that there is something inherently collective about employment.
Similarly, a case can be made that general contract principles are largely sufficient. I think the
latter view is correct. See Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Cri-
tique of the New Deal ,Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983) [hereinafter Epstein,
Common Law], for the definitive statement of the case for the generalist law. See BERNARD
ROBERTSON, THE STATUS AND JURISDICTION OF THE NEW ZEALAND EMPLOYMENT COURT (N.Z.
Business Roundtable, Aug. 1996), and Maryan Street, The Future of the Employment Court
and Tribunal: The Labour Party's View, in A SPECIALIST EMPLOYMENT LAW JURISDICTION:
THE FUTURE OF THE COURT AND TRIBUNAL 2-4 (1993), for a discussion of the argument in the
New Zealand context. I proceed on the assumption that there will be some aspects of law and
fact unique to labor and employment disputes.
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jam but at most one variety of "Vegemite."3
As these examples suggest, the degree of specialization in the market is
a response to factors such as consumer demand or a desire to preempt com-
petitors.4 In law, however, market forces play only a muted role around the
edges! Getting the degree of legal specialization "right" is thus more im-
portant than getting the degree of specialization in toppings for bread
"right"-in the latter case, a manufacturer that produced "crunchy"
Vegemite6 may well go bankrupt; in the former, a government which opts
for the wrong degree of specialization causes problems, but is unlikely to
disappear.
The appropriateness of specialized legal institutions in a particular case
rests on the balance between specialization's benefits and its dangers.
Evaluating that balance is trickier than it first appears. Without market
measures of success, we must fall back on hypothetical counterfactuals.7
Nonetheless, a combination of theory and experience with specialist bodies
in other areas provides some guidance.8 Part I of this Article describes the
use of specialized legal institutions in New Zealand and the United States,
while Part II assesses the appropriateness of both countries' institutions in
light of the theoretical literature on legal specialization.
3. To an American, Vegemite defies explanation. Popular in New Zealand and Australia,
it is a yeasty spread used on bread.
4. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 97-99 (1988)
(discussing theories of product differentiation).
5. While a state legal system which significantly under-provided or over-provided spe-
cialization might find private competitors springing up on the margins, as they have in the
United States where private courts are increasing, the state legal system retains significant
advantages in crowding out competition.
6. My New Zealand friends assure me that such a product is unthinkable. Having chick-
ened out when offered the chance to try a "smooth" Vegemite sandwich, I accept their judg-
ment on this issue.
7. For example, what would judicial decisions interpreting the Employment Contracts
Act [hereinafter ECA] be like if they were rendered in the first instance by a generalist court?
Possibly, such a court would be less inclined to look to principles from pre-ECA labor juris-
prudence than the specialist Employment Court, drawn from the pre-ECA Labour Court.
However, it might not. American courts have freely innovated in employment law in the last
thirty years, and the interpretation of the ECA might undergo a process similar to the Mon-
tana Supreme Court's 1980's decisions eviscerating that state's codified at-will rule. See An-
drew P. Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws"-Lessons From One Hundred
Years of Codification in Montana, 56 MONT. L. REV. 359, 433-42 (1995). On counterfactuals
in legal reasoning, see Robert N. Strassfeld, If...: Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 339 (1992).
8. European countries make extensive use of specialist institutions in dealing with labor
and employment law, although that may be related to their civil law systems. This Article
deals only with the United States and New Zealand to keep the focus on common law sys-
tems. Other common law countries whose experience would be relevant, such as Britain,
Canada, and Australia, are excluded to keep the length under control. See Benjamin Aaron,
Labour Courts and Organs of Arbitration, 16 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA COMP. L. 16-1 (1985);
Benjamin Aaron, Settlement of Disputes over Rights in Comparative Labour Law and Indus-
trial Relations, INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 260 (R. Blanpain ed., 1990).
SPECIALIZED LABOR LAW INSTITUTIONS
I. SPECIALIZATION FOR LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. New Zealand
New Zealand began relying on specialist bodies to structure its labor
market as part of a series of interventions into industrial relations in the
1890s.' Specialist legal institutions played an important role in implement-
ing the statist system of labor relations that emerged from the 1890s through
active involvement in wage setting, mediation, and arbitration. In the 1970s,
however, the role of specialist bodies shifted away from wage-fixing to
governing parts of the employment relationship previously dealt with
through the common law, generalist courts."° Changes to the system in the
Industrial Relations Act 1973 and continuing through the Industrial Rela-
tions (Amendments) Act 1984 introduced some new elements and changed
the focus from interest disputes to rights disputes," but did not significantly
diminish the overall role of specialist institutions or the overwhelmingly
collectivist nature of the labor law system. 2 Although the pre-ECA special-
ist institutions had jurisdiction over union sector issues only, the relatively
large size of the union sector made them significant to the labor market as a
whole.
After 1984, however, New Zealand embraced market economics in
"one of the most notable episodes of liberalization that history has to of-
fer."' 3 New Zealand's post-1984 market reforms aimed at achieving, wher-
ever possible, a competitive environment in which markets can operate
9. The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1894 created the major specialist
institutions. Rose Ryan & Pat Walsh, Common Law versus Labour Law: The New Zealand
Debate, in DIVERGENT PATHS? INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 297 (Nigel Haworth et a]. eds., 1993). See HENRY BROADHEAD, STATE
REGULATION OF LABOUR AND LABOUR DISPUTES N NEW ZEALAND 17-30 (1908), for a de-
scription of the early specialist institutions under the ICA. Other interventions in the 1890s
included mandatory minimum conditions of employment, restrictions on trading hours, and
restrictions on the employment of women and minors. Kevin Hince, From William Pember
Reeves to William Francis Birch: From Conciliation to Contracts, in EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS: NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCES 7 (Raymond Harbridge ed., 1993). Interventionism
was not, of course, limited to the labor market, but part of a general program of state man-
agement of the economy. Indeed, until the 1980s, New Zealand had "more pervasive" gov-
ernment regulation than other similar OECD countries combined with widespread state own-
ership of entities in many sectors. Lewis Evans et al., Economic Reform in New Zealand
1984-95: The Pursuit of Efficiency, 34 J. ECON. LrIERATURE 1856, 1860 (1996).
10. Ryan & Walsh, supra note 9, at 298; Gordon Anderson, Specialist Employment Law
and Specialist Institutions, A SPECIALIST EMPLOYMENT LAW JURISDICTION: THE FUTURE OF
THE COURT AND TRIBUNAL 2 (1993).
11. Anderson, supra note 10, at 2. These changes included the distinction between dis-
putes of interest and disputes of right, a degree of voluntarism, Hince, supra note 9, at 8, and
elimination of centralized wage determination, Evans et al., supra note 9, at 1878.
12. Ellen J. Dannin, Labor Law Reform in New Zealand, 13 N.Y.L.SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 1-2 (1992) ("[T]he only real changes prior to 1991 were essentially emendations
of its seminal nineteenth-century legislation," the IC& A Act 1894.).
13. Evans et al., supra note 9, at 1856 (quoting David Henderson).
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relatively free from subsequent intervention by government. For the private
sector, great emphasis has been put on improving price signals through re-
ducing import protection and other such barriers to competition, and at-
tempting to reduce uncertainty through consistent, medium-term-oriented
government policies.
4
As part of the reform process, New Zealand reexamined its labor rela-
tions legislation, ultimately producing the ECA.'5 Because these reforms
were initiated by a Labour government, however, the introduction of market
principles to industrial relations lagged.
6
Although the labor and employment law changes of the 1970s and
1980s were significant, they did not produce change fast enough to satisfy
market-reform advocates, particularly in the business community. 7 With the
National Party's 1990 victory came comprehensive labor relations reform.
The debate over these reforms which ultimately resulted in the ECA finally
included discussion of the role of specialist institutions.'8 As described
14. Id. at 1863.
15. With the Labour Relations Act 1987 and the State Sector Act 1988, New Zealand
experimented by introducing elements of a market-oriented, contractual model into its col-
lectivist labor relations system. It also moved away from the tripartite model to a single judge
structure. Ryan & Walsh, supra note 9, at 299. Perhaps the most significant change intro-
duced by the 1980s debate was the discussion's shift to the issues articulated by the business
community. Dannin, supra note 12, at 7. Despite these changes, and although the 1980s leg-
islation introduced significant changes to the labor relations system, the issue of specialist
institutions was postponed for later discussion. Ryan & Walsh, supra note 9, at 298.
16. Evans et al., supra note 9, at 1871 ("[A] Labour government could not realistically
deregulate the labor market or reduce welfare spending as readily as a National government.
Instead it started the deregulation process with the pro-reform financial sector.").
17. Pat Walsh & Rose Ryan, The Making of the Employment Contracts Act, in EM-
PLOYMENT CONTRACTS 15 (1993); Anderson, supra note 10, at 4 (noting "much stronger as-
sertion of the so-called "right to manage" as "a feature of the Rogernomics and post-
Rogernomics era"). The pre-ECA legislation left important concepts to be fleshed out by the
Labour Court. Gordon Anderson, The Origins and Development of the Personal Grievance
Jurisdiction in New Zealand, 13 N.Z. J. IND. REL. 264 (1988); Ellen J. Dannin, Three Years
Out: The Labour Court's Treatment of Dispute Resolution Procedures, 21 VICTORIA U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 259, 273 (The court is "given great and virtually unguided discretion to
determine and institute creative and effective remedies."). This left the Court room to act, as
Professor Anderson phrased it in describing the court's actions under the 1973 law, in "a rea-
sonably innovative fashion." Anderson, supra note 10, at 264. The Labour Court relied "on
developments in other jurisdictions to aid it in its decisions and ... acknowledged the range
of sources it draws on in several cases." Id. For example, the Court reached the (to American
eyes) extraordinary conclusion that "[t]he ultimate. . . test of justification [of dismissal] ... is
the opinion of the Court" in a 1983 decision, Wellington etc. Drivers IUW v. Fletcher Con-
struction. Id. at 267 (quoting Wellington etc. Drivers IUW v. Fletcher Construction, A.C.J.
653, 666 (1983)).
18. Four options were considered in Parliament: (1) retention of the existing LRA
structure, (2) a combination of a specialist lower tribunal and the Labour Court, (3) a spe-
cialist lower tribunal with appeal rights to the High Court, and (4) abolition of specialist in-
stitutions. John Hughes, The Employment Tribunal and the Employment Court, 16 N.Z. J.
IND. REL. 175 (1991); Walsh & Ryan, supra note 17, at 24. The Department of Labour sup-
ported the second option, arguing it provided for "continuity" at the higher level and an inex-
pensive, flexible means of addressing labor issues at the lower level. Hughes, supra, at 175
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elsewhere in this Symposium, the ECA introduced far-reaching changes in
the substantive law, eliminating significant numbers of specialist notes and
shifting many areas of law from generalist courts to specialist bodies. 9 The
ECA replaced the earlier specialist institutions with two new specialist
bodies: the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Court. The Tribunal
provides "speedy, fair, and just resolution of differences between parties to
employment contracts, it being recognized that in some cases mutual reso-
lution is either inappropriate or impossible." 20 It provides both mediation
and adjudication, although restricting (but not eliminating) the pre-ECA
practice of involving the same individuals in both activities in particular
cases.2 In adjudication, the Employment Tribunal moved towards the judi-
cial model and away from the Labour Relations Act (LRA) committee
hearing form.22
The Employment Court, initially staffed by the members of the now-
defunct Labour Court,3 serves as both an appellate and supervisory body for
the Employment Tribunal and is also a court with original jurisdiction. In
the latter capacity, the Employment Court has broader jurisdiction than the
preceding Labour Court, covering claims of breach of individual common
law employment contracts." Efficiency and flexibility were the primary ra-
tionales for retention of the specialist approach.25 New Zealand's specialist
institutions have among the broadest jurisdictions internationally.
26
The Employment Court's record since 1991 is controversial. The New
Zealand business community has been critical of the specialist structure for
(quoting DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR TO THE LABOUR
SELEcT COMMrrrEE (1991)). The Treasury supported abolition. Walsh & Ryan, supra note
17, at 21. The debate was less comprehensive than it might have been because the National
government originally intended to deal with substantive law before dealing with institutions.
ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 18. Unlike the substantive issues, the government entered the
debate with "no clear policy" and, according to Robertson, "no apparent grasp of the issues."
Id.
19. Anderson, supra note 10, at 3.
20. Employment Contracts Act § 76(c), 1991 (N.Z.) [ECA].
21. Hughes, supra note 18, at 177.
22. Id. at 178.
23. ECA § 188.
24. Hughes, supra note 18, at 179; ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 21-22. The Employ-
ment Court also has additional jurisdiction over "harsh and oppressive" employment con-
tracts. ECA § 57. The Employment Court's powers are limited, however, by a provision re-
quiring a heightened standard of proof before the court can cancel a contract or vary its terms.
ECA § 104(2). Professor John Hughes summed up the cumulative impact of the various re-
strictions on the Employment Court: "Overall, then, the emphasis is on restricting the Court's
ability to intervene in the employment relationship to ensure a minimal level of fairness."
Hughes, supra note 18, at 181. Even with the significant limitations the ECA imposed on the
Employment Court, such a role is well beyond the role a common law court would play in
resolving contractual disputes.
25. Max Bradford, The Future of the Employment Court and Tribunal: The Government
View, in A SPECIAUST EMPLOYMENT LAW JURISDICTION 6-7 (1993).
26. Anderson, supra note 10, at 8.
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paying too much attention to contract content, being too willing to modify
contracts by implying additional terms,2 and being inconsistent with the
ECA's overall market orientation.2 Some have accused it of attempting to
sabotage the market-oriented, contractual model of the ECA.29 Labor advo-
cates, on the other hand, have defended its interpretations as necessary to fill
gaps or express underlying social values of New Zealand society, even
while conceding that the Employment Court is not interpreting the ECA
quite as written. °
The ECA introduced two related and significant changes into the role of
specialist institutions. First, the ECA changed the character of employment
disputes by reducing the number of employees covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements and increasing the number covered by individual con-
tracts of employment.3 The ECA thus shifted the disputes which the Em-
ployment Court must resolve toward contracts more susceptible to
interpretation under ordinary contract principles. Second, it created a single
legal framework, tied to contractual principles, for determining disputes
over labor and emplor'ment law. Both fundamentally changed the role of
specialist institutions.
27. Nick Wailes, The Case Against Specialist Jurisdiction for Labour Law: The Philo-
sophical Assumptions of a Common Law for Labour Relations, 19 N.Z. J. IND. REL. 1, 3
(1994) (describing criticisms).
28. Lorraine Skiffington, The Role of Specialist Legal Institutions in Bargaining Under
the Employment Contracts Act 1991: Saboteurs or Saviours?, 21 N.Z. J. IND. REL. 49, 50
(1996) (describing criticisms); COLIN HOWARD, INTERPRETATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS ACT 1991 23-24 (N.Z. Business Roundtable, 1995) ("The quite extraordinary re-
sistance to implementation of the Act manifested by a section of the judiciary" is one of the
two reasons the ECA is "not working as well as it could and should.").
29. HOWARD, supra note 28, at 14 (describing decisions "as illustrations of the manner
in which a judiciary which is manifestly out of sympathy with the policy of a statute can
blunt its effect and frustrate at least some of its purposes").
30. See, e.g., Ellen J. Dannin, Bargaining Under New Zealand's Employment Contracts
Act: The Problem of Coercion, 17 CoMp. LAB. L.J. 455, 491 (1996).
On the one hand, section 57 must offer protection to workers or it will offend
New Zealanders' sense of morality and justice. On the other hand, if the court
softens the impact of section 57, it usurps Parliament's allocation of power in
the workplace. As it stands, social mores in New Zealand, along with the de-
cision in Culhane, have prevented the courts from upholding the harshest uses
of the ECA .... By refusing to permit the Culhane employer to contract with
more willing sellers of labor, the Employment Court effectively subverted the
will of Parliament.
Id. See also Street, supra note 2, at 1 (specialist institutions and contractarian approach "do
not sit well with each other").
31. See Raymond Harbridge, The Employment Contracts Act: An Assessment of the Im-
pact of the Legislation on Bargaining Arrangements, in DIVERGENT PATHS? INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE ASIA-PACIFIc REGION 214, 218 (Nigel Ha-
worth et al. eds., 1993). Richard Whatman et al., Labour Market Adjustment Under the Em-
ployment Contracts Act, 19 N.Z. J. IND. REL. 53, 56-57 (1994).
32. Commenting on pre-ECA New Zealand institutions, Professor Gordon Anderson
argued that the pre-1988 legal regime was marked by "a tendency to treat different areas of
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In the past thirty years, New Zealand's labor relations system, and in-
deed its entire economy, have undergone massive changes. Two character-
istics are present throughout. First is the reliance on specialist legal bodies.
Given that these bodies' jurisdiction and roles have changed dramatically
over time, particularly in recent years, their persistence is puzzling. At the
least, one would expect that the arguments for specialization that justified
such institutions in the collectivist past would no longer be valid in the con-
tractual present. Second, although the basic philosophy of the industrial re-
lations system has changed almost completely, both the prior collectivist
system and the current contractual system are explicit attempts to create co-
herent systems to govern labor and employment law. These systems are
themselves part of larger, coherent visions of New Zealand society.
B. United States
American legal institutions for labor and employment law are quite dif-
ferent from those in New Zealand. In part these differences reflect the dif-
ference between federal and unified national legal systems and the larger
geographic scope of the United States. As the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the various civil
rights acts and the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC)
demonstrate, however, there is no constitutional impediment to creating ei-
ther specialist legal rules or national specialist decision-makers to govern
aspects of employment and labor law. The continued reliance on state and
generalist institutions in the United States therefore represents at least some
degree of policy choice.
Because the residual set of rules and institutions for handling employ-
ment (but not labor) law matters remains state contract law, federal legal in-
stitutions and rules in this area are the result of ad hoc interventions into the
labor market. Because many of these interventions take place through ad-
ministrative agencies, the dominant form of federal specialist institution is
not a court but an administrative agency, often combining executive, legis-
lative, and judicial functions within a single entity.
At the federal level, the NLRB and EEOC are the most visible special-
ist institutions. The Social Security Administration's disability insurance
programs, complete with an extensive array of specialist bodies and gener-
alist court review, provide the greatest volume of decisions concerning the
labor market. Numerous other specialist institutions, from the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) to the Federal Labor Re-
lations Authority, exist as well, with varying degrees of impact on the labor
market.
The federal generalist courts play two important roles in labor and em-
employment security as different issues rather than to regard them as a single, if multifaceted
problem." Anderson, supra note 10, at 258.
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ployment law. First, even where primary adjudicatory responsibility is as-
signed to specialist decision-makers, appellate authority often remains in the
generalist courts 3 Second, the federal generalist courts act as inferior state
courts under the Erie doctrine in diversity cases. In some instances, federal
courts have addressed state law questions far in advance of the state courts
and played a significant role in at least temporarily altering state law.m
At the state level, the most important institutions are the generalist
courts, since a significant portion of employment law is state contract law.
Even where specialized rules apply, and there are a significant number of
state laws regulating particular aspects of the labor market,35 enforcement is
often left to actions in state courts (brought by either state officials or pri-
vate actors). There are important state specialist institutions as well. Social
insurance programs such as unemployment insurance and workers compen-
sation insurance generally include a specialist body as the initial decision-
maker and sometimes as the first level of appellate review. State labor de-
partments have authority to render decisions in particular areas, although
often limited by a requirement of enforcement through the generalist courts.
Finally, states have many specialist institutions and rules which parallel fed-
eral institutions and rules-state civil rights, occupational safety and health,
and wage and hour enforcement agencies, for example.
In sharp contrast to New Zealand, specialist institutions for labor and
employment law in the United States are thus primarily ad hoc intrusions
into a labor market at least nominally based upon general contract rules.36
While these underlying generalist legal rules have been significantly eroded,
particularly by federal interventions in labor relations and civil rights, the
generalist heritage has left generalist courts with a significant role even with
respect to specialist rules. Moreover, it has been left largely to the generalist
courts to formulate legal doctrines to harmonize the ad hoc statutory regula-
tions with the underlying contract-based legal rules. Thus, generalist courts
have been called upon to determine what effect to give to unemployment
33. For example, the decisions of the OSHRC can be appealed to the federal courts.
Moreover, in some cases the specialist body is assigned only limited authority to enforce its
decisions, requiring resort to the generalist courts for enforcement. Thus, the NLRB must
seek to enforce its orders through the federal courts.
34. See Andrew P. Morriss, Developing a Framework for Empirical Research on the
Common Law: General Principles and Case Studies of the Decline of Employment-at-Will,
45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 999, 1033-38 (1995); Mark R. Kramer, Comment, The Role of
Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employment At Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania,
133 U. PA. L. REv. 227 (1984).
35. See JAMES 0. CASTEGNERA ET AL., TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT: EMPLOYER AND
EMPLOYEE RIGHTs (1997) (summarizing state employment laws relating to discharge).
36. See, e.g., Soderlun v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 1997 WL 45279, *3 (Colo. App.
Feb. 6, 1997) ("Aside from the specific principles adopted by the [Colorado] supreme court
in this prior jurisprudence, its significance lies in that court's consideration of the employ-
ment relationship pursuant to concepts developed by traditional approaches to the common
law of contracts. The supreme court has not purported to create any special rules to deal with
employee claims of contract breaches.").
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insurance commission decisions on the existence of cause for discharge or
an individual's claim of disability in a social insurance application in a suit
by an employee alleging wrongful discharge. 7 Moreover, compared to New
Zealand, the United States has not undergone a rethinking of the system of
laws governing industrial relations. The United States' use of specialist in-
stitutions is thus doubly ad hoc: the specialist institutions themselves are the
results of ad hoc interventions, and the general system in which they are
embedded is unmarred by attempts at consistency.
II. ASSESSING THE USE OF SPECIALIST LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
New Zealand's reliance on specialist legal institutions appears to rest
largely on a conviction that labor and employment laws are different from
other types of law. 9 Much of the debate over the continuation of the spe-
cialist institutions under the ECA, for example, builds on the Ep-
stein/Getman-Kohler ° debate over the need for specialized labor law.'
37. See infra note 75.
38. Evidence of this lack of debate is the broad, bipartisan support for even highly inter-
ventionist employment legislation in the U.S. For example, despite the debate over affirma-
tive action today, we are still only a few years past a conservative, Republican president
comparing the Americans With Disabilities Act to the fall of the Berlin Wall, George Bush,
Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, available in WL A&P
101-336 Mat'l (July 26, 1990), and a conservative, Republican presidential candidate label-
ing its signing a "second Independence Day." Jake Thompson, Dole and Bush Commemorate
Law, KANSAS CrrY STAR, July 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2436074. When the major
political party nominally identified with market principles trumpets the most far-reaching,
interventionist law in decades as a triumph, it is clear that there is little real public debate
over the subject.
39. See, e.g., Gordon Anderson & Pat Walsh, Reshaping Labour Law: An Alternative
Industrial Relations Future, in DIVERGENT PATHS? INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN AUSTRALIA,
NEw ZEALAND AND THE ASIA-PAcmc REGION 19 (Nagel Haworth et al. eds., 1993). ("[Tlhe
neo-classical contract model inadequately describes the employment relationship. The classi-
cal model is based on discrete transactions and takes insufficient account of long-term rela-
tional contracts. The employment relationship is constructed over time by the actions of the
parties and any analysis of the employment relationship must adequately address these inter-
nal dynamics."); Anderson, supra note 10, at 9 (Labor and employment law "clearly is" a
specialist area.). As Robertson points out, this argument fails to distinguish between em-
ployment relationships and employment disputes before the court. In the latter, "[m]any of
the cases between individuals (as opposed to unions) and employers concern relationships
which have already ended." ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 19.
40. Epstein, supra note 2; Richard A. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A
Rejoinder to Professors Getman and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435 (1983); Julius G. Getman &
Thomas C. Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law and Reality: A response to Professor Ep-
stein, 92 YALE L.J. 1415 (1983). While there are arguments that labor and employment law
require rules which differ from ordinary contract law, arguments I believe are largely mis-
taken, they are arguments about the need for different rules to solve problems caused by
characteristics of the labor market. Thus, for example, some argue that employees have too
weak a bargaining position relative to employers to effectively bargain for job security. See
Skiffington, supra note 28, at 50 (summarizing arguments). Proponents of specialist institu-
tions in New Zealand argue that the common law is too individualistic to govern industrial
relations effectively, because industrial relations possess a collective nature. Wailes, supra
1997]
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Many of the employer organizations' complaints about the Employment
Court's decisions relate to their perception of that body's continued insis-
tence on the application of collectivist legal principles in what the employ-
ers' associations view, with some justification, as a market-based, contrac-
tual framework.42
New Zealand's debate over whether specialist institutions are appropri-
ate to labor and employment law sets it apart from the United States. In the
United States, specialist tribunals in labor and employment law are almost
entirely justified in terms of efficient processing of claims in mass programs
like workers' compensation and unemployment insurance. Because so much
of American employment and labor law is not based on principle, the ap-
propriateness of institutional choice is a largely unasked question. I turn
now to examining the two countries' institutions in light of the general spe-
cialization literature.
note 27, at 8. The flaw, according to the pro-specialist camp, was in the ECA, not the institu-
tions: the Act "failed to acknowledge the inherent disparity of bargaining power between em-
ployer and employee." Skiffington, supra note 28, at 49. Whatever else such a rule may be,
however, it is not legally complex, and the facts of the labor market are more likely to be
oversimplified by proponents of special rules than the reverse. Even if one accepts the argu-
ment that special rules are needed, they are not rules which require special decision-makers in
the same way patent law might, as the facts in employment cases are no more difficult as a
group than the facts in commercial contract cases. Moreover, the group of judges initially ap-
pointed to the Employment Court lacked any significant expertise in labor relations.
ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 21 (two former family court judges, two employment lawyers,
two general practice lawyers, and a defamation expert). The technical expertise of the deci-
sion-maker is thus an unconvincing rationale for specialization. There is more of an argument
to be made in favor of allowing the parties to designate decision-makers to resolve disputes
which arise under contracts: Someone familiar with the history of a workplace and of dis-
putes under a contract might be more efficient at resolving new disputes than a wholly new
decision-maker.
41. See, e.g., Ryan & Walsh, supra note 9, at 300-02; Nick Wailes, A Critique of R.A.
Epstein's Common Law for Labour Relations, in DIVERGENT PATHS? INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE ASIA-PAcIC REGION (Nigel Haworth et al. eds.,
1993); Wailes, supra note 27. Epstein's influence is significant with respect to other areas of
the New Zealand debate. Professor Dannin, for example, concludes that "[tihe main intellec-
tual source for the ECA can be traced directly back to the United States and almost exclu-
sively to one article by Richard Epstein[, In Defense of the Contract at Will.]" Ellen J. Dan-
nin, Consummating Market-Based Labor Law Reform in New Zealand: Context and
Reconfiguration, 14 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 267, 303 (1996) (notes omitted). Professor Wailes takes
a similar view. Wailes, supra note 27, at I ("[Ilt is generally acknowledged that Epstein's
ideas have had a significant influence in shaping the 'abolitionist' case.").
42. See Skiffington, supra note 28, at 50 (summarizing criticisms). Some employee and
union advocates have taken a similar view, arguing that the "extension of the Act to all em-
ployment contracts represents a major extension of specialized labour law and thus the basis
for the future development of an autonomous system of labour law." Anderson & Walsh, su-
pra note 39. In addition to the "employment is different" rationale, efficiency concerns sur-
face with some regularity as justifications. Ryan & Walsh, supra note 9, at 306 (citing trade
union arguments based on cost and time).
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A. Technical Competence
Specialized review functions are more appropriate to deal with "the
most technically difficult, the most novel and uncertain, and the most time-
consuming cases in order to maximize the reduction of poor understanding,
disuniformity and overburden. 4 3 While the technical competence argument
is frequently made with regard to science-based fact and patent law issues,4
they apply outside science-based factual complexity as well. The U.S. doc-
trine of deference to labor arbitration set forth in the Steelworkers' Trilogy,
45
for example, ultimately rests upon the idea that understanding the nuances
of a collective bargaining contract is enhanced by a combination of special-
ized knowledge concerning industrial relations and the particulars of each
contract." Similarly, where a statute is particularl complex, a specialized
decision-maker may be better able to interpret it.4 The record of specialist
41institutions in providing technical expertise is difficult to assess.
Even if special labor and employment law rules are to be applied, there
is little reason to suspect that a generalist court would be incapable of doing
so. Technical expertise in the labor and employment law context is mostly
familiarity with the statutes, not specific training in industrial relations.
43. David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 CoLuM. L. REV. 1, 78 (1975).
44. Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice? 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 745 (1981); Cur-
rie & Goodman, supra note 43, at 67; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication,
1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 377, 409. This argument was made in the U.S. in patent cases as early
as 1901 by Judge Learned Hand. See LEARNED HAND, HISTORICAL AND PRACTICAL CON-
SIDERATIONS REGARDING EXPERT TESTIMONY 15, HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901).
45. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelwork-
ers v. Warrier & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
46. The validity of this assumption is questionable in many circumstances. For example,
most collective bargaining agreements in the United States provide simply that covered em-
ployees may not be discharged except for just cause. Interpreting such a straightforward
phrase appears to be well within the abilities of any competent judge.
47. Ellen Jordan makes this argument in terms of doctrinal stability. See Jordan, supra
note 44, at 747. The Chevron doctrine in American administrative law reflects this view: in
reviewing federal administrative agencies' interpretations of regulatory statutes, the courts
must defer to the agencies' interpretation if the interpretation is a "permissible" one. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Chevron illustrates the rationale for leaving
such determinations to specialists: not only did interpretation require familiarity with the ex-
traordinarily complex U.S. Clean Air Act, something presumably within the capability of
judges, but required resolution of ambiguities in the statute that turned on policy judgments.
Id. at 865-66. The Courts' application of the Chevron doctrine is controversial and inconsis-
tent. See ALFRED C. AMAN AND WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 471-77 (1993).
48. With the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and patent law, for example,
Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss's review found that the median decision time had not declined
and the number of cases had not decreased. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:
A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 76-77 (1989). She concluded that
the quality of decisions may have been improved, although quality is hard to measure. Id. at
76-77. In instances where the technical competence required is not drawn from another disci-
pline, the technical competence argument is even more difficult to evaluate.
156 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
Judge Posner's observation that even generalist judges tend to be knowl-
edgeable about various areas of the law because of their specialization in
decision-making is particularly apt in this context. 9 Since employment is-
sues are likely to arise frequently in the generalist courts (or at least more
frequently than, for example, patent disputes), generalist judges will have
extensive opportunities to learn the statutes.
B. Doctrinal Stability
Specialized legal institutions may be better able to provide doctrinal
stability than generalist institutions under some circumstances. Where a le-
gal system divides decision-makers on non-doctrinal grounds (e.g., geo-
graphically defined courts), differences in interpretation of legal rules may
arise across the courts.50 Such differences may persist over time, either be-
cause the final decision-maker leaves conflicts unresolved (as the U.S. Su-
preme Court often does with inter-circuit conflicts) or because there is no
final decision-maker (as with conflicts of law among the states in the U.S.).
Where differences persist, the outcome of disputes may depend on chance
or forum shopping, introducing uncertainty about the applicable rule, re-
ducing the ability to rely upon the law, and causing inequities."
49. See infra note 55.
50. Currie & Goodman, supra note 43, at 65. Specialization at the appellate level is most
important where uniformity is sought. Dreyfuss, supra note 44, at 429. Inconsistency is more
likely as the number of jurisdictions increases, where focal points for the appropriate rule are
absent, and where the application of the different rules imposes significant costs on the par-
ties. Thus, if some jurisdictions imposed a rule requiring employers to pay redundant em-
ployees two weeks of severance pay while others required four weeks of severance pay, the
difference would prompt less forum shopping than if one jurisdiction followed the employ-
ment-at-will rule and the other followed a broad interpretation of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing which effectively granted employees "just cause" protection. Ex-
cept in cases where specialization is justified by the complexity of the legal rules, doctrinal
stability is derived from replacing a geographically defined decision-maker with a monopoly
decision-maker. While gaining the benefits of specialization is easier where the specialist in-
stitution has exclusive jurisdiction, several scholars have endorsed the concept of allowing
litigants a choice between specialist and generalist fora as a means to avoid some of the
problems of specialization. Dreyfuss, supra note 44, at 435; Jordan, supra note 44, at 765-67.
This approach is used in the United States with the federal Tax Court, where litigants can
choose either the generalist courts or the specialized court. Allowing such a choice, however,
reintroduces forum shopping and consistency issues which specialization was intended to
eliminate. Specialization is thus justifiable on these grounds only where the rules to be inter-
preted are significantly more complex than the typical legal rule or where the expected costs
of inconsistency in rules are great.
51. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195, 217-20
(1975). The benefits of doctrinal stability require creating a specialist institution not itself
subject to swings in doctrine. To the extent that it occurs, see infra section D, capture could
undercut the uniformity of law over time as the specialized body swings from camp to camp.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 152 (1985). At the same time, successfully gain-
ing these benefits may produce undesirable effects: where specialization leads to geographic
concentration of a court (compared to geographically dispersed generalist courts), specializa-
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The doctrinal stability argument is simply inapplicable to a country the
size of New Zealand which lacks multiple geographically based jurisdic-
tions. In the case of the United States, a more convincing rationale can be
constructed by recounting the multiple jurisdictions to which a particular
employer (or employee who is frequently transferred) might be subject. The
problem, however, is more easily solved by enforcing choice of law clauses
in contracts (and perhaps encouraging their inclusion with a penalty default
rule52 where they are absent) than by creating a separate decision-making
body. Moreover, because of the capture problems discussed above, assign-
ing national authority to any agency or court would set off a fierce, con-
tinuing struggle for control of the agency, potentially creating doctrinal cy-
cles that would make the NLRB appear stable.
C. Administrative Efficiency
Specialization avoids the potential for creating additional inconsisten-
cies among or within existing generalist courts caused by expanding either
the number or size of such courts to meet increased demand. Meshing the
efficient specialist body with the generalist court system can introduce new
problems, however, that must be considered as part of the costs of any effi-
ciency gain at the lower level."' Specialist decision-makers may be more ef-
ficient because they see more of the same kind of cases, although this de-
pends on a somewhat Fordist view of the judicial process. 5 Deciding cases,even deciding similar cases, is not assembly line worki 6 To the extent that
tion favors those who can afford to litigate in the specialist court's location and enhances the
opportunities for capture. Dreyfuss, supra note 44, at 422-23. The problem of expense may
be mitigated by the existence of a specialized bar, although such a bar may contribute further
to the problem of capture. Id.
52. See Ian Ayes & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (explaining penalty default concept).
53. It is an argument for creation of some specialization, although not necessarily for
creation of particular specialist institutions. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 43, at 64-65.
54. Appeals to the generalist courts can be limited, of course, although the experience
with severely limited appeals in the U.S. veterans benefits area suggests that such a course
raises important fairness issues. See infra note 57.
55. In thinking about specialization, we need to remember that even generalist courts are
a type of specialized institution; they are simply specialized by function rather than by sub-
ject matter. PosNER, supra note 51, at 149-50. Appeals courts, for example, "specialize" in
deciding appeals; trial courts in holding trials. This focus allows generalist decision-makers
not only to develop the skills necessary to resolve matters efficiently (e.g., appellate judges
have greater skills at analyzing trial records; trial judges have greater skills in making on-the-
spot evidentiary rulings and determining witness credibility), but also exposes them to a wide
range of issues in the law. Thus, for example, Richard Posner argues that generalist appellate
judges have greater knowledge of particular areas of the law than do lawyers or legal aca-
demics who focus on those areas because the latter must spend a considerable portion of their
time doing things besides thinking about the law in the specific area. Id. To the extent that
judging is an intellectual process of reasoning, rather than akin to assembly line work, Pos-
ner's view seems more persuasive.
56. For an extensive survey of the literature on judicial decision-making, see Gregory C.
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judicial decision-making does not resemble assembly line production, effi-
ciency gains from specialization are likely to be small.
Moreover, even when the efficiency gains are real, the efficiency of
specialized bodies is not always an advantage. After examining the U.S. ex-
perience with specialized decision-makers, Professor Jordan argued that
where a national consensus on the goals of the laws is lacking, the far-
reaching and irreversible nature of the choices to be made demands that de-
cisions be reached deliberately and carefully. In those areas, the speed and
efficiency of the specialist may be exactly the wrong prescription, since it is
wisdom and deliberation, combined with a full hearing from all affected in-
terests, which is needed. 7 Efficiency is thus a double-edged sword. It allows
quicker processing of mass numbers of claims, but at the cost of a loss of
individualized justice."'
The relative efficiency of different forms of decision-making body is an
empirical question whose resolution would require far more data than are
now available, although the initial experience in New Zealand suggests cau-
tion in claiming such gains. 9 If we compare the American social security
program with the judicial process, however, the outlines of potential prob-
lems with specialized administrative bodies become clear. New Zealand's
experience mingling adjudication and mediation responsibilities also sug-
gests reasons why care in this area is necessary. Based on sheer numbers,
employment and labor law rank well behind other candidates for easing the
burden on generalist courts, such as criminal law and family law. Moreover,
efficiency requires more than simply deciding mass numbers of cases-
efficient rules can often reduce the number of disputes that require decision
more effectively than increased processing speed can clear dockets.
D. Capture
The potential for capture of a specialist decision-maker by proponents
of a particular position is one of the most significant problems with such
bodies.60 Capture is often why a specialist court is set up. An interest group
Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An
Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
57. Jordan, supra note 44, at 765.
58. Programs like the U.S. social security disability insurance program would likely be
impossible without such a tradeoff. The requirement of the use of specialized bodies and
mass claims which receive only "bureaucratic justice" for such programs ought to provoke a
reexamination of the programs, not the unquestioning acceptance of the tradeoff, however.
59. See T.C. Goddard, The Rule of the Employment Court, in A SPECIALIST EMPLOYMENT
LAW JURISDICTION: THE FUTURE OF THE COURT AND TRIBUNAL 16 (1993).
60. While the problem of capture is more serious where views of the law are already
polarized, creating bodies capable of being captured can prompt the formation of interest
groups which then attempt capture. The expected net benefits of creating a lobbying group,
for example, are increased when an institution capable of being captured exists, since the
probability of successful capture is enhanced and the cost of organization reduced. Thus, it
may not be worthwhile to lobby for the creation of a capture-prone body, given that the lob-
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does not like the way ordinary courts decide an issue. It employs a politician
to lead an attempt in the legislature to get the issue out of the hands of "old
fashioned" judges and into the hands of "progressive" specialists.6
Even if not set up to facilitate rent-seeking, specialized bodies are more
likely than generalist decision-makers to be captured by a particular ideo-
logical camp.62 Specializing by subject matter, the benefits of sympathetic
decision-makers are significantly increased by concentrating particular
types of disputes in one body.6' The potential for capture is also increased
because appointments to specialist bodies are more likely to be drawn from
the population of experts on the subject matter, who "are more sensitive to
swings in professional opinion than an outsider, a generalist, would be.6
bying may fail. But once the body is created, the existence of the capture prone body itself
will create interest groups. For example, once a specialized court is created, a specialized bar
is likely to arise, providing both the pool of talent for use in capturing and the bar associa-
tions to conduct the lobbying efforts to capture the court. The problem of capture is thus not
limited to instances where interest groups already exist.
61. Charles W. Baird, The Employment Contracts Act: Almost a Model for the World, 3
THE SOCIAL CRITIC 22-27 (1996) (visited June 18, 1997). See also ROBERTSON, supra note 2,
at 15 ("Specialist Courts are created when some interest group does not believe that equal
application of the laws by judges applying the traditional canons of statutory interpretation
and the traditional values of the common law will result in decisions that favour its own ide-
ology and interests.").
62. POSNER, supra note 51, at 152; Richard A. Epstein, Employment Law: Courts and
Contracts (N.Z. Business Roundtable 1996); Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Admin-
istrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 331 (1991); Jordan, supra note 44, at 748; Currie &
Goodman, supra note 43, at 70-71. The 1988 creation in the United States of the Court of
Veterans Appeals (CVA) illustrates the problem of capture. Prior to the creation of the CVA,
veterans had limited rights of appeal from Veterans Administration decisions regarding bene-
fits. The CVA was created as part of the creation of an appeal process for veterans. Despite
the obvious benefits of appellate rights to veterans, several veterans advocacy groups op-
posed the creation of the CVA, in part because they feared a loss of member loyalty if law-
yers began to play a role in the process. (The veterans groups in question provided assistance
with the pre-existing administrative appeals process.) Another group of veterans advocates
favored allowing appeals in the generalist courts because their members had experienced dif-
ficulties with Agent Orange claims in the VA administrative process. In a political compro-
mise that appears to have more to do with satisfying the veterans groups' professional staffs
than substantive concern for veterans, the CVA was created with strict controls on attorneys'
fees, centralized appeals to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Washington, and
provisions allowing non-attorney veterans advocates to represent claimants. See Laurence R.
Helfer, The Politics of Judicial Structure: Creating the United States Court of Veterans Ap-
peals, 25 CONN. L. REv. 155, 161, 169-70 (1992).
63. Compare the benefits to either side from the appointment of a sympathetic individual
to the National Labor Relations Board in the U.S. with the benefits of a similar appointment
to a U.S. federal court of appeal. The latter position is likely to produce the opportunity for a
small number of decisions concerning labor and employment law; the former will provide
one of five votes on critical labor law issues on a regular basis.
64. POSNER supra note 51, at 152. The judges themselves may also "capture" a specialist
court. Judges might come to substitute their judgment for that of the parties because of the
judges' greater expertise, where an uninitiated generalist judge might be more reluctant to
interfere in others' decisions. Currie & Goodman, supra note 43, at 71. Assigning jurisdiction
to a specialist institution may thus itself make the institution more activist. To the extent that
preserving private arrangements is important, this is a disadvantage. See also HOWARD, supra
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The perception of capture is a problem even where a specialized court
escapes actual capture.6 Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss argues that speciali-
zation can create the perception of capture when there is no public consen-
sus on the law in its area. This perception could thus undercut the advan-
tages specialist decision-makers might have in promoting uniformity.
67
Specialist institutions are also more easily dominated by the other
branches of government because "it is easier to predict how someone will
decide cases in his specialty than how he will decide cases across the
board."6 Thus, even without attempts by the parties to disputes to gain sym-
pathetic decision-makers, the executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment may use this predictability to erode judicial independence in the sub-
stantive area.
Labor and employment law are particularly likely to produce capture
problems for specialist bodies for several reasons. First, there are clearly
identified "sides" to disputes. Second, outcomes are also easy to identify-
either the employer or the employee wins, making score keeping by interest
groups straightforward.6 Third, ideologically screening candidates before
their appointment is straightforward, since "litmus tests" are readily avail-
able on labor and employment issues.70 In the United States, for example,
positions or replacement workers and the minimum wage can be used to
"score" candidates as pro-labor or pro-employer. Finally, there is a great
deal of money at stake.
note 28, at 15 (noting "clubby atmosphere" surrounding appointment to specialist bodies).
65. Currie & Goodman, supra note 43, at 72.
66. Dreyfuss, supra note 44, at 415 ("The heterogeneity of [a new generalist court's]
docket makes it likely that there will be some issues that it can handle in a manner that vali-
dates the bench; indeed the court need only receive and follow precedent to gain a measure of
public acceptance .... In contrast, when a specialized court is established in an area where
there is no consensus, there is nothing for the public, practitioners, or other courts to measure
its rulings against, and it becomes an easy target for those who disagree with its decisions.").
67. The potential for capture can be reduced if the specialist institution is designed care-
fully. Professor Dreyfuss suggests, for example, that placing a specialist body within an
agency (in the United States, making it an Article I court) "would remind reviewing courts to
be vigilant for signs of capture" and "diminish public suspicion of an institution called a
'court,' which is structured differently" from the traditional generalist courts. Dreyfuss, supra
note 44, at 431. Unfortunately, many of the steps which reduce the problem of capture do so
by diluting the gains from specialization. Thus, providing a mix of unrelated business, which
Professor Bruff labels "semispecialization," reduces the gains from capture, but also dilutes
the potential gain from technical expertise. Id. at 340-41.
68. POSNER, supra note 51, at 154; Epstein, supra note 2.
69. See ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 31 (describing how decisions will be interpreted).
Of course, legal rules and decisions are often sufficiently subtle that counting victories by one
side or the other may be an inadequate measure of a judge's sympathies, but the ease of such
counts encourages them.
70. See ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 31 (discussing politicization of a vacancy on the
Employment Court).
71. Unionization, to take an obvious example, is often expensive for the firm-most esti-
mates put the union wage premium at about 15 percent, although opinions differ on whether
there are compensating gains for the employer. Wrongful discharge law in the U.S. appears
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The experience of both countries demonstrates the reality of capture in
labor and employment law. In the United States the NLRB is subject to pe-
riodic swings, as the Board majority shifts between Democratic and Repub-
lican appointees. (These shifts are magnified by the NLRB's practice of
generally eschewing rulemaking in favor of a case-by-case approach, which
rewards those able to read the subtle signs in decisions about future doctrine
shifts.) In New Zealand, the staffing of the Employment Court with the
judges of the former Labour Court creates at least the perception of capture
by opponents of the ECA. Pledges by the Labour Party to "review the func-
tions of the Employment Court"72 suggest that the politicization of the Court
is an accomplished fact."
E. Boundary Problems
Specialization is easier to envision in the abstract than to implement:
"Real-life conflicts may spill over many 'fields' of law, and result in frag-
mented judicial consideration of closely linked problems., 74 Gaining the
benefits of specialization requires assigning appropriate disputes, and only
those disputes, to the specialist institution. Where a case touches across
multiple fields, specialized and generalist decision-makers must determine
which portions of a dispute belong in each. For example, social insurance
matters are often intertwined with employment law issues, as where a per-
son with a disability is potentially eligible for coverage under laws requiring
employers to accommodate disabilities and for social insurance payments
for his disability." Avoiding boundary issues is an important part of suc-
also to impose significant costs. See JAMES A. DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAROLY, LABOR
MARKET RESPONSES TO EMPLOYER LIABLrrY 62-63 (RAND Corp. Inst. for Civil Justice Paper
R-3989-ICJ, 1992) (estimating aggregate employment losses of 2-5 percent from wrongful
discharge law).
72. Maryan Street, The Future of the Employment Court and Tribunal: The Labour
Party's View, in A SPECIALIST EMPLOYER LAW JURISDIcTION 6 (1993).
73. As Robertson notes,
The Labour Party thus explicitly states that the future jurisdiction and status of
the Employment Court is dependent upon how well it fits into Labour's
scheme of things. The precedent of a specialist Court having been set, the
government could obviously sideline any judge who did not make the 'right'
decisions by reshuffling the specialist Courts and reassigning the judges....
ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 30.
74. Jordan, supra note 44, at 748.
75. The Third Circuit recently determined that assertion of inconsistent positions in any
type of proceedings can result in estoppel. Ryan Operations, G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lum-
ber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 1996). It applied the doctrine to bar an employee who had
made sworn statements that he was disabled in a disability insurance proceeding from claim-
ing that he was capable of performing his job in a wrongful discharge suit under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit applied the doctrine to bar an em-
ployee who had obtained a favorable settlement of a workers' compensation claim (which
assumed she was disabled) from making a civil rights claim. Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steam-
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cessful specialist institutions. New Zealand appears to have begun to expe-
rience these problems.77
Unfortunately, labor and employment law are particularly susceptible to
these problems. Work touches on almost every aspect of our lives. It defines
what we do with a large portion of our waking hours, is the source of im-
portant relationships, and provides the resources for most people's daily
lives. We may socialize outside the workplace, raising issues of liability for
conduct while engaged in company-sponsored non-work activities. Personal
relationships may begin at work, potentially implicating employer policies
on nepotism. When families and other personal relationships disintegrate,
work is involved.78 The interconnectedness of employment with other as-
fitters Local 343, 1996 WL 490350 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 1996). The D.C. Circuit, on the other
hand, recently held that a claim of disability in a social security proceeding did not prevent a
claimant to be otherwise qualified for a position under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
since the latter statute required assessing the employee's ability to perform a job with ac-
commodation by the employer and the former did not. Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority, 1997 WL 335143 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 1997); Whitbeck v. Vital
Signs, Inc., 1997 WL 335140 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 1997).
Even where cases may not raise boundary issues directly, the question of when problems
are sufficiently general to warrant allowing attacks in the general court system remains. The
specialist body may make decisions consistent with the specialized rules but inconsistent with
more general rules governing due process, for example. Thus, in the United States, social se-
curity disability decisions--"a system of mass administrative justice"-require a safety valve
of access to the federal courts for review, "which has assured a sense that justice was achiev-
able, even in a massive system that grudgingly accepts its gritty imperfections." Phyllis E.
Bernard, Social Security and Medicare Adjudications at HHS: Two Approaches to Adminis-
trative Justice in an Ever-Expanding Bureaucracy. 3 HEALTH MATRIX 339, 353 (1993). In the
particular case of American social security law, this has been complicated by the refusal of
the specialist decision-making body to accept generalist courts' interpretations of the under-
lying law (the doctrine of nonacquiesence) and conflicts between the bureaucracy and the
actual decision-makers charged with implementing the specialist regulations. Creating the
institutional mechanisms necessary to control these problems, such as review authority in a
higher level generalist court, is thus also important. Of course, if the generalist court is capa-
ble of the review function, this calls into question its lack of competence to handle the initial
dispute.
76. Bruff, supra note 61, at 339 ("[T]he subject matter for specialized courts should be
chosen "for its segregability from other claims."); Dreyfuss, supra note 44, at 409 (extent to
which field can be segregated important to success of specialist institution). Not only can liti-
gation over which disputes are appropriate destroy any gains in judicial economy created by
specialization, but litigants are more likely to lose substantive rights through mistaken pursuit
or non-pursuit of claims when they must maintain dual actions in specialist and generalist
courts than where one body can hear all claims. Id. at 438-39. See also HOWARD, supra note
28, at 16 (criticizing New Zealand courts' handling of boundary problems in labor and em-
ployment law). Even sympathetic observers conclude "that the issue of jurisdiction is con-
stantly evolving." Shirley Homewood, Decision-making Trends in the Court and Tribunal, in
A SPECIALIST EMPLOYMENT LAW JURISDICTION 8 (1993).
77. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 17 (summarizing comments of New Zealand judges on
jurisdictional problems); id. at 21 ("complex, haphazard and arbitrary nature of the jurisdic-
tional divide between the Employment Court and the High Court"); id. at 42-54 (detailing
specific boundary problems).
78. If health insurance is provided by an employer, for example, the collapse of a mar-
riage raises issues about how the ex-spouse's coverage will be affected. Allocation of income
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pects of our lives is one reason why cases are unlikely to fall neatly into
boxes labeled "employment and labor" and "other."79 As Bernard Robertson
notes, "Employment cases can raise questions in contract, tort, equity, res-
titution, public law and even criminal law. It seems then that Employment
Court judges, far from being experts in a narrow area, have to have a thor-
ough understanding of the whole seamless web of the law, as do High Court
judges."
80
Changes in workplace structure also make it increasingly difficult to
distinguish employment from other commercial relationships. As more in-
dividuals find themselves outside the traditional model of employment,
classifying their relationships into either "employment" or "other" becomes
more difficult. Robertson labels the distinction between contractors and em-
ployees as the "greatest" boundary problem, noting that "[two people oper-
ating under very nearly the same contractual conditions can find their affairs
regulated by entirely different procedural and substantive law."'" Indeed, the
blurring of such classifications is undoubtedly partially related to employ-
ment and labor law. As programs like workers' compensation become more
expensive for employers, the incentive to restructure to avoid the legal label
of employer increases.
Moreover, as Robertson notes, boundary problems multiply because the
specialist and generalist courts may have different views of the appropriate
boundary locations.82 The creation of boundary disputes should thus be con-
sidered a major reason for avoiding specialist courts in labor and employ-
ment law.
F. Cross-pollination
Specialization has costs for the development of the law in the areas
covered by both the specialist and the residual generalist rules. Because both
specialist and generalist judges are no longer directly exposed to the mate-
rial seen by the other, the flow of legal ideas between the two is reduced.83
and retirement and other benefits between former spouses is also necessary in many cases.
79. Distinguishing between employment law and labor law is itself becoming difficult in
the United States, as an increasing number of decisions wrestle with the possible preemption
of state employment law claims by federal regulatory statutes such as the National Labor Re-
lations Act (NLRA) and Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)and attempts
by employees covered by collective bargaining agreements to obtain the more generous
remedies available at common law.
80. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 26.
81. Id. at 22.
82. Id. at 40-41.
83. POSNER, supra note 51, at 156 ("Judicial specialization would also reduce the cross-
pollination of legal ideas."); Bernard, supra note 75, at 352 (Specialization will lead to
"balkanization" of the judiciary.). Cross-pollination is important primarily to the extent that
decisions will be improved by judges having broader experience. If the decision-maker is
called upon to decide cases under a complex statutory scheme, then the benefit from cross-
pollination is likely to be small. The more general the rules to be construed by the decision-
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That exposure to a wide range of problems has important benefits: it is a
better guarantee of "sound decision-making" than "initiation into an arcane
set of mysteries,""U prevents judges from attributing an exaggerated impor-
tance to particular problems, and prevents judges from relying on
"preconceptions that the fresh mind unclouded with intimate knowledge
would wish to reexamine,""' and prevents marginalizing the judges and the
opinions they write.
This is particularly important for labor and employment law; the task of
interpreting contracts is one where exposure to a wide range of cases is
likely to benefit the judge." Even if special rules apply to particular provi-
sions of employment contracts, they are still contracts and the techniques of
contract interpretation are general ones. Moreover, understanding the differ-
ences between the special rules and the more general rules would be en-
hanced by experience with both forms.
The arguments made about the difficulties in drawing boundaries be-
tween employment and labor law and the rest of the law apply to the im-
portance of doctrinal cross-pollination as well. As employment becomes
more intermingled with other aspects of our lives, the benefits to law from
developments elsewhere increase. This cross-flow has been important in the
United States. 9 Indeed, the common law process depends on borrowing
concepts, trying them, and adjusting them to fit the circumstances of new
cases.
maker, the more useful cross-pollination is likely to be.
84. Bruff, supra note 61, at 331.
85. Id. at 331.
86. Currie & Goodman, supra note 43, at 69.
87. Dreyfuss, supra note 44, at 413.
88. Epstein, supra note 2.
89. For example, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a generally ap-
plicable contract law concept which some U.S. courts have applied to employment cases.
Significant precedents in the early development of this doctrine have come from non-
employment cases, particularly in the insurance area, where the concept is more fully devel-
oped. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987) (applying insurance
law rationale to employment case). From an initial broad reading of the implied covenant,
many American courts have backed away, limiting damages, rejecting it outright, or limiting
its application. See, e.g., Decker v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Colo., Inc., 931 P.2d 436, 443
(Colo. 1997) (covenant "is designed to ensure enforcement of other obligations assumed by
the parties" to a contract). On the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, the at-will rule in
the U.S. also developed in part by analogy to agency, real estate, and partnership cases and
continues to be defended in part by analogies to some of those areas. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 958-62 (1984); Andrew
P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge
Law, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1901 (1996).
90. See Robert G. Natelson, Running With the Land in Montana, 51 MoNT. L. REV. 17,
91 (1990) (arguing that borrowing legal concepts is best done through common law process).
SPECIALIZED LABOR LAW INSTITUTIONS
G. Judicial Quality
If there is a significant reduction in the caliber of the judges, the quality
of decisions may be lowered.9 Avoiding such a loss of quality is particu-
larly important where the rationale for specialization depends in part upon
the need for greater skills in the specialized body, however, undercutting the
specialization's advantages in such cases. To the extent the gains from spe-
cialization come from successfully segregating technical matters from other
legal issues, the potential for the court's business to become boring and re-
petitive increases as well, reducing the ability to attract good judges.92 Spe-
cialist courts also may be less prestigious than generalist courts. The im-
portance of this effect is unclear, however, as the drop in quality of the
judges may need to be substantial before a noticeable effect appears.
However, neither New Zealand nor the United States appears to have
experienced any trouble securing decision-makers of sufficient caliber for
their higher level tribunals such as the Employment Court9S or the NLRB.
Lower-level tribunals in the United States, such as unemployment compen-
sation boards, are more difficult to staff with "top" lawyers, which is more
likely a reflection of their lack of status as non-judicial bodies and relatively
low salaries, than of their specialized functions.
III. CONCLUSION
Examined in terms of the general criteria for specialization, both New
Zealand and the United States fall short of justifying their current institu-
tions. New Zealand's specialist institutions are inconsistent with its general
shift toward governing employment with general legal principles rather than
91. Jordan, supra note 44, at 748; Currie & Goodman, supra note 43, at 70.
92. Dreyfuss, supra note 44, at 425.
93. Bruff, supra note 61, at 331; Jordan, supra note 44, at 748. Since a court's prestige
plays a role in attracting qualified individuals to serve on it, reducing the court's prestige
through specialization may reduce the attractiveness of judicial appointments. Increasing spe-
cialization at the appellate level would reduce the variety of judges' work and, Posner argues,
would reduce job satisfaction. POSNER, supra note 51, at 150-52.
94. It is possible, for example, that simply reducing the number of elite law school
graduates on the bench could improve the quality of decisions if they were replaced by
graduates of "lesser" law schools more attuned to the practical consequences of their deci-
sions and less focused on abstract legal theory. In an empirical work-in-progress with Profes-
sors Gregory Sisk and Michael Heise, we found no evidence that elite law school background
made federal district judges more likely to behave differently in reviewing the constitutional-
ity of the federal sentencing guidelines in 1988, including deciding on the constitutionality of
the guidelines or in choosing among the various theories advanced on why the guidelines
were unconstitutional. See Sisk et al., supra note 56.
95. Even critics of the Labour Court and Employment Court concede that its status is
equal to the High Court. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 2. New Zealand Employment Court
Chief Judge T.C. Goddard noted that two judges "promoted" to the Employment Court from
the High Court would not be likely to wish to return to "getting their teeth into the general
jurisdiction of the High Court." Goddard, supra note 59, at 3.
1997]
166 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
with specialist rules." American specialist institutions are the result of ad
hoc intrusions into the labor market. In both countries, moving toward gen-
eralist decision-makers would reduce the potential for capture, eliminate
costly boundary disputes, and provide greater opportunities for the law's
continued evolution. In sum, both countries' specialist institutions appear to
resemble "crunchy" Vegemite, not the more wholesome variety of jams.
In particular, New Zealand needs to reexamine the issue of the appro-
priateness of its institutions independent of the issue of specialist rules. The
United States would do well to follow New Zealand's example and make
both its rules and institutions subject to a public debate. The lack of such
debate will only grow more troubling as the increasing numbers of ad hoc
labor market interventions generate increasing conflicts amongst them-
selves.
96. See ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 17 (noting that the former president of the Labour
Party and former National Party Finance Minister agree that the ECA is inconsistent).
